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on the probability that the same product is subsequently exported to a non-
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Abstract:  This paper investigates whether preferential trade 
agreements (PTA) promote exports to third nations through the 
expansion of the extensive margin (i.e. larger number of export 
goods). The analysis covers 11 South-South and South-North 
PTAs involving 36 countries that exported to 118 different 
destinations during the 5 years before and after the PTA. Using a 
conditional logit model, and trade data at the SITC 5-digit level, 
we estimate the effect of new within-PTA exports on the 
subsequent exports to third-nation markets. The results suggest that 
PTAs have a positive indirect effect, i.e. spillover-effect, on 
exports to third countries. Previous export experience in a given 
product in the preferential area is shown to have a positive effect 
on the probability that the same product is subsequently exported 
to a non-member market. The size of the effect, however, varies 
across PTAs. 
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1. Introduction  
Market access and market expansion have been the main economic drivers behind the proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) of the last twenty years. Although the vigorous spread of PTAs is 
relatively recent, researchers have been studying their direct effects, namely trade diversion
1 and creation 
effects
2 for over fifty years (see Viner, 1950, and for a review of the literature see Freund and Ornelas, 
2009). But little has been said on the dynamic effects of PTAs and in particular on the spillovers that they 
could produce on the exports to non-members. Yet, taking into account these indirect effects is essential 
to accurately measure the net effects of trade agreements. By ignoring these positive externalities, one 
could underestimate the trade creation effect and, therefore, the net effects of PTAs. The purpose of this 
paper is to assess whether a positive externality affecting third countries exists and can be associated with 
preferential trade agreements. Using SITC-5digit level mirrored import data for 36 countries, we test 
whether their participation in a PTA affect the probability to export to other markets outside the trade bloc.  
Determining whether such spillovers exist is important not only to correctly assess the net effects of a 
PTA, but also to gain better understanding on how exporters expand into markets. A positive externality 
generated by a PTA could have implications for market expansion, as exporters could use PTAs as 
stepping stones (i.e. testing grounds) to break into other markets. From a policy perspective, this also 
implies that a PTA could promote both product and, indirectly, market diversification.  
Recent trade models with heterogeneous firms highlight the relationship between trade costs and the 
number of exported products (i.e. the number of exporters). Melitz (2003)’s baseline model with 
symmetric countries, beachhead costs (i.e. market entry costs) and fixed export costs predicts that 
following a decline in tariffs new firms will start to export to markets whose tariffs have declined. 
According to this framework, more firms will enter markets within the preferential area, as access to 
members’ markets becomes easier. At the product level, this implies that new products will be exported to 
a market within the PTA area. The model does not have any theoretical implications for the effects of 
PTAs on the decision to enter markets outside the trade bloc.
3 Yet, one can expect that as firms start to 
export a product to the preferential area, they may, conditional on their survival, try to expand into other 
markets outside the bloc. This expansion into markets outside the bloc could be explained by different 
mechanisms, namely learning by exporting or economies of scale at the production or export level. These 
channels are not exclusive and will be detailed in the next section.  
This paper investigates whether trade agreements have promoted exports to non-members through the 
expansion of the extensive margin (i.e. the number of exported goods). The analysis studies 11 South-
South and South-North PTAs involving 36 countries, which export to 118 different destinations, over a 
period covering the 5 year periods preceding and following the entry into force of the PTA. If the 
extensive margin expanded within the preferential area following the agreement, more products will 
benefit from previous experience which could increase their likelihood to be exported to other countries. 
                                                 
1 I.e. trade that is diverted from a more efficient exporter outside the preferential area towards a less efficient one 
within the preferntial area. 
2 I.e. trade that is created within the preferential area. 
3  By taking foreign markets as a single entity, the model ignores the dynamics behind export expansion and so 
behind the persistence of export status. Such dynamics could entail that firms keep selling in the same market or 
expand to other markets.    75
Using a conditional logit model, we estimate at the SITC 5-digit level the effect of previous export 
experience within the preferential area on the probability to export the same product to a market outside 
the bloc. Then we interact a PTA dummy with the experience variable to test for the existence of a trade 
externality due to the PTA. Our results suggest that such spillover can exist, but this varies with the 
agreement considered. We also test our result using the tariffs within the preferential area, instead of a 
PTA dummy. In this case, the evidence in favor of the spillover is not conclusive.   
The literature examining the relationship between PTAs and the extensive margin has mainly focused on 
the effects within the preferential area and has overlooked the effects on exports outside the PTA area. 
This literature has found that PTAs encourage existing trade as well as new exports to the preferential 
area. In an influential contribution, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) find that the existence of a 
PTA increases the probability that the participating countries trade with each other. In another study 
Gómez and Volpe (2008) analyze the effect of tariffs and tariff preferences on the number of exported 
products from Colombia to the United States for the period 1989-2005. They find a negative relationship 
between tariffs and the extensive margin. Debaere and Mostshari (2005) obtain similar results in the case 
of all United States’ partners for the period 1989-2001. Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) also investigate the 
evolution of the extensive margin in the case of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
4 and find that they have had a positive effect on 
new exports. Finally, Amurgo and Pierola (2008) also find that FTAs favor export product diversification 
in a group of 24 developed and developing countries. 
To our knowledge only two studies have looked at the effect of PTAs on exports to third countries: Nicita 
et al. (2003), for the case of MERCOSUR, and Borchert (2007), for the case of NAFTA. These two 
studies differ on the mechanism behind the spillover and find mixed evidence of the existence of a trade 
externality. The present study contributes to this fledgling body of literature. Nicita et al. (2003) try to 
assess whether MERCOSUR helps the expansion of exports from members to countries outside the 
preferential area by reducing the information asymmetries faced by both exporters and importers. 
Information asymmetries in the case of importers arise because the latter are uncertain about exporters’ 
reliability and product quality. As for exporters, they also face an imperfect information problem as they 
are unfamiliar with customs procedures, export regulations, customers’ tastes and standards in the 
markets they intend to export to. The authors argue that by selling to the preferential area exporters can 
earn a reputation and reveal their competencies to other potential importers. This could reduce the 
uncertainty faced by importers. In the case of exporters, they can mitigate the information asymmetry 
problem by taking PTA markets as a learning ground to gain experience before entering more distant or 
“difficult” markets. The authors test the effect of these information spillovers (generated within the 
preferential area) on the exports to countries outside the bloc
5, as well as a platform effect that is an 
interaction term between the information variable and the preferential tariffs within MERCOSUR. Using 
a Tobit model they estimate the impact of the spillover effects and the platform factor on the exports at 
the SITC 3-digit level for each of the MERCOSUR members for the period 1980-1998. For each member 
they regress the exports to 54 different partners on the information effect and the platform effect. They 
                                                 
4 They also study the structural transformation episodes in Chile, Korea, and China. 
5The export information spillovers are proxied by the share of newspapers (information trade flows) traded between 
a MERCOSUR’ partner and a third country, multiplied by the past market share of a MERCOSUR member in all 
of its trading partners. The platform effect is captured by interaction between preferential tariffs, the information 
trade flows and past market share of a MERCOSUR member within the bloc.   76
find a positive platform effect working through the information spillovers but only in the case of Paraguay. 
Unlike the present study, the authors do not distinguish whether the effect on exports at the industry level 
goes through the extensive margin or the intensive margin. 
Borchert (2007) analyzes whether NAFTA triggered a geographic spread of Mexican exports to countries 
outside NAFTA. The mechanism behind this effect works through the existence of economies of scale at 
the export level (i.e. due to the existence of a product export fixed cost that is a decreasing function of the 
number of markets served). As a result, in the model, firms’ efficiency increases with the number of 
markets it serves. The author uses HS 6-digit level trade and tariff data to analyze the exports from 
Mexico to the US and 16 Central and South American countries between 1990 and 1997. Using a logit 
model with fixed effects, he estimates the effect of previous exports to the US on the probability of 
exporting the same product to third markets. He finds that Mexican post-NAFTA exports to the US were 
subsequently exported to other Latin American countries. Moreover, the results suggest that the 
expansion of the extensive margin is mainly due to the increase in the number of exported goods with 
little or no technology content. The study do not control for the fact that a product could have been 
exported to other markets than the US, and so the spillover effect may be overestimated. The present 
paper proposes to address this limitation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the mechanisms through which a 
PTA could affect the exports to third countries. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy employed to 
identify the spillover effects. Sections 4 and 5 present the data and the stylized facts on the pattern of new 
goods. Section 6 details the empirical analysis and its results. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Market expansion and its mechanisms  
In this section we review the mechanisms that can explain the spillovers from PTAs to exports to non-
member countries.  
Once a product has been exported to at least one market, expansion into additional markets requires 
decisions about which markets to enter. Despite its importance, the interest on the patterns of market 
expansion and its determinants is relatively new. The geographic dimension was only recently 
incorporated in trade models with heterogeneous firms (which until now assumed markets symmetry). 
These models highlight the differences among markets and the factors that may affect exporters’ decision 
to serve or not a given market. In Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the market entry depends not only on the 
usual determinants (i.e. productivity, trade costs) but also on market characteristics such as its size and the 
“intensity” of competition in foreign markets. In their model, larger markets show “tougher” competition, 
which in turn results in lower mark-ups (hence lower prices) and higher aggregate productivity. As a 
consequence, these markets are more difficult to break into. In another paper, Lawless (2009)
6 analyzes 
the determinants of market penetration by incorporating a destination dimension into the Melitz model. In 
this framework, each market has a productivity requirement, so that firms do not export to every market, 
but only to those that are profitable. This suggests that if a firm is efficient enough to enter the z-market 
with a productivity threshold z, it will also serve all markets with a threshold lower than z. By matching 
their productivity with markets’ cut-off, firms determine which countries they enter and which ones they 
                                                 
6 Lawless (2009) develops a model à la Melitz in which firms face not only export fixed costs but also export 
variable costs that are market-specific, generating a cut-off for each destination.   77
don’t. Eaton et al. (2007) document the patterns of market expansion using a sample of Colombian firms. 
In their study, the authors describe the behaviour of “cohorts” of Colombian exporters between 1996 and 
2005 and find that market expansion takes place gradually. New exporters start selling in a single foreign 
market and, conditional on their survival they expand into additional destinations. The initial destination 
market appeared as an important determinant of exporters’ geographic expansion and of their probability 
of survival. Firms exporting to “neighbours” seemed to have greatest probability of diversifying into more 
distant markets, while the opposite does not occur.  
We have identified in the literature three mechanisms that could explain the expansion into other markets 
and that could be catalyzed by the entry into force of a PTA. These are (i) the presence of economies of 
scale at the production level (i.e. production fixed costs); (ii) the existence of learning effects (i.e. 
“learning by exporting”); and (iii) the presence of economies of scale at the export level (i.e. export entry 
costs).
7  
The presence of economies of scale in the production stage is a possible explanation for the correlation 
between exports within the bloc and future exports to third markets. The consumer base in many countries 
is often too small to favour goods whose production is characterized by increasing returns to scale (i.e. 
with declining average costs). In these cases, because of the size of the market, firms can not produce 
profitably as they cannot generate the necessary sales to cover their fixed costs. In the new trade theory, 
this relationship between market size and production is known as the “home market effect” (HME) (see 
Krugman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman, 1985, chap. 10). According to this logic, in models with 
imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale and trade costs, larger markets will attract a more than 
proportional share of firms (this implies greater number of varieties) and become a net exporter of the 
differentiated good.
8   This implies that by enlarging the home market, a PTA would make the 
location/production of products subject to increasing returns to scale more attractive inside of the 
preferential area. Firms will therefore produce within the bloc and then export to countries outside the 
bloc, thus making the preferential area the base for exports to countries outside the bloc as suggested in 
Baldwin et al. (2003, chapter 14).
  
To make this point clearer, we consider the following example. Assume three countries A, B and C of 
different sizes: A=20, B=20 and C=30. A and B are two small markets, such that it is not profitable to 
produce certain goods. A and B are therefore net importers of these goods. Countries A and B sign a PTA, 
which removes all tariffs. As a result their home market expands (A+B=40), now making it profitable to 
produce goods characterized by increasing returns to scale. The “newly” formed market attracts a more 
than proportional number of firms, which will serve markets A and B, but also market C. Thus the 
preferential area between A and B becomes the export base.
9  
                                                 
7 Each of this three mechanism can be represented in a standard profit function:  ( ) e F f a p q − − − = π , where q 
is the quantity, p is the price, a is the marginal cost, f is a production fixed cost and Fe is the export fixed cost. 
Mechanism 2 refers to a change in the marginal costs (a), while mecanims 1 and and 3 refers respectively to the 
existence of the fixed cost f and the export fixed cost Fe.      
8 In other words, due to economies of scale and in presence of transport costs, the differentiated product will be 
produced in only one country, the one with the larger home market, and serve both countries. The formation of a 
larger market allows firms to distribute fixed costs over a larger consumer base and markets.   
9 It is worth noting that depending on countries’ comparative advantage, endowments and market size, a product 
could be produced only in A or B. However, the distribution of industries within the bloc goes beyond the scope of   78
Learning by exporting, the second mechanism that can be at play, describes the positive impact of export 
participation on firm’s productivity (i.e. marginal cost). According to this mechanism, firms improve their 
productivity as a consequence of their presence in export markets. Through their interaction with 
competitors and buyers, exporters can be exposed to new technologies in international markets (i.e. 
technology transfer) and greater expertise, which may help them to improve their manufacturing process, 
reduce their production costs and encourage innovation (i.e. quality upgrading).
10 This mechanism could 
be at play for firms exporting into the preferential area. The productivity gains thus generated could then 
allow them to enter third markets previously not profitable.
11 In this respect a few studies show that there 
is a positive relationship between a firm’s productivity and the number of markets the firm serves 
(Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2006; Lawless, 2009).
12 This implies that the entry into an additional 
market is costly and therefore suggests that an increase in firms’ productivity could induce firms to export 
to another market. The relationship between firm productivity and the number of markets has been 
documented in Bernard et al. (2009) in the case of the US, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004, 2008) in 
the case of French firms and Amador and Opromolla (2008) in the case of Portuguese firms. In the 
context of our analysis, if exporting to the PTA area improves firm’s performance through learning by 
exporting, this could change firm’s incentives to enter markets outside the bloc.  
Finally, the existence of export entry costs can also constitute a reason behind the expansion into other 
markets outside the preferential area, as they can generate economies of scale for the export activity. 
These exports costs include the costs associated with learning about export and customs procedures, 
markets and consumer tastes, and with establishing distribution channels. Improved market access could 
help exporters to overcome these fixed costs. Once the latter are paid, the average cost of exporting the 
same product to additional destinations should be lower, as in Borchert (2007).  
Learning about the export activity and the accumulation of knowledge could also reduce the uncertainty 
of entering a market and generate information spillovers as in Nicita et al. (2003), which in turn may 
reduce the fixed costs associated with entering new markets. The importance of information and 
uncertainty related to export activities has also been highlighted in Albornoz et al. (2009). The authors 
build a model where export success is uncertain and this uncertainty is correlated across markets. As a 
result, exporting is a gradual process (i.e. sequence of exporting) driven by the accumulation of 
experience across markets. In their model, firms discover their profitability as exporters only after they 
enter foreign markets. Their success in export markets is therefore unknown before entry. Once they enter 
a market, they learn about their real capabilities and have to decide whether (i) to stay in the market and 
adjust their quantities; (ii) to exit the current market; or (iii) to enter a new market or not. Since the entry 
into new markets often requires significant and unrecoverable costs, firms have an incentive to enter one 
market after the other, starting with the “easiest” one. The latter is presumably less costly to break into 
                                                                                                                                                               
this study. Here we focus on the effects of the formation of a larger market through a PTA on the exports to 
countries outside the area. 
10  One could expect this mechanism to be stronger when trade involves a developed country or at least more 
developed country than the exporting country.  
11 The empirical evidence on “learning by exporting” is mixed and so far there is no consensus on the existence of 
such effects. Examples of studies suggesting learning by exporting include De Loecker, J. (2007), Van Biesbroeck 
(2005) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998). 
12 The authors also find that the number of exporting firms and the number of exported products decline with 
distance and increase with market size. Another main result is that new exporters begin selling a single product in a 
single market and then, conditional on survival, they grow both along the destination and product dimension.   79
and so can be used as a “testing ground” before serving more distant or “difficult” markets. Their authors 
suggest that a PTA would increase the number of exporters outside the bloc, as a result of greater export 
experimentation in “easier” markets within the bloc.    
Provided that any of these mechanisms is at work, one expects PTAs to increase the number of products 
into markets situated outside the bloc. Moreover it is worth noting that while the first mechanism is 
specific to the creation of a larger market and thus of a preferential area, the two other mechanisms 
provide a more general explanation for market expansion.  
3. The spillover of PTAs to third markets 
In this section, we look at how PTAs can affect exports to third markets – the spillover – by triggering the 
expansion mechanisms described above. More specifically, we describe how PTAs can provide a ground 
for export experimentation, where exporters can develop their competencies, enhance their productivity 
and benefit from economies of scale, all of which mechanisms can then help them break into third 
markets. 
Once a new product is introduced in a foreign market, exporters will presumably want to expand their 
sales and serve one or several other markets. This is compatible with existent empirical evidence, which 
shows that most of the exporters start selling in a single destination and then, conditional on their survival, 
expand progressively to other markets (see inter alia Alvarez et al., 2007; Eaton et al., 2007).  
Figure 1 describes the export sequence. In t=1, a firm in country i has to choose whether to export or not 
and, if it exports, it has to decide where. In t=2, a firm has again to decide to export or not, to keep 
exporting to country m only, provided it entered that country in t=1, or to enter an additional market (i.e. 
country j).  For clarity purposes, we only depict the choice in t=2 for a firm which serves country m in 
t=1. The choices in the remaining nodes of the decision tree are analogous. 


















Assuming that any of the mechanisms (i.e. or a combination of them) described in section 2 are at play 
(i.e. learning by exporting, economies of scale at the production level, or economies of scale at the export 
level) the probability of exporting product k to country j, given that it was first exported to country m 
should be greater than without a previous experience in exporting product k. Formally this implies that: 
( ) ( ) kjt kmt kjt Export p Export Export p > −1 |  (1)   80
This relationship is independent of the existence of a PTA,
13 that is, any previous export experience 
would positively affect the probability to export to other markets.
14 However, following the 
implementation of a PTA (i.e. a decline in tariffs), markets within the bloc become presumably easier to 
access for most or all products. One can therefore expects an increase in the number of new products 
exported to the preferential area (Melitz, 2003), here country m. The probability to export a given product 
to a member country should increase during the years post-PTA, that is: 
() ( ) PTA with kmt PTA without kmt Export p Export p <    (2) 
If this is the case, the number of new products that can be potentially exported to non-member countries 
also should increase. In other words, the probability of exporting product k to both markets j outside the 
PTA area, and m, inside the PTA area should increase in the post-PTA years.
 15  This probability is given 
by:
16 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 | − − − × = ∩ kmt kmt kjt kmt kjt Export p Export Export p Export Export p  (3) 
 
If  () 1 − kmt Export p increases following a decline in tariffs in market m, the probability 
( ) 1 − ∩ kmt kjt Export Export p  of exporting the same product to j and m would also increase according to 
equation 3.  This is the spillover of the PTA, and is conditional on the increase in the number of new 
exported products to the PTA area. Formally, we have:  
( ) ( )
PTA with kmt kjt PTA without kmt kjt Export Export p Export Export p 1 1 − − ∩ < ∩  (4) 
To test the existence of any spillover effect due to PTAs, we look only at the new exports (i.e. the 
extensive margin) to markets outside the preferential area and use the order in which countries penetrate 
markets to first assess whether any previous experience had a positive effect on the likelihood to enter a 
market outside the preferential area. We then check how this effect changes once we control for the 
existence of a PTA.
17 If the PTA did not promote the export of new products to member markets, the 
probability of exporting should not change, and so there should be no effect on the new exports to non-
members associated with the implementation of the agreement. If the PTA boosted the number of new 
products to member countries, this can generate an indirect positive effect on the number of opportunities 
to export to non-member markets. 
                                                 
13 Indeed, any previous exporting experience regardless of the market (i.e. member or non-member) will have a 
positive impact on the exports to countries outside the area (e.g. Robert and Tybout, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 
2004). 
14 One could also expect that the size of the probability  ( ) 1 | − kmt kjt Export Export p   would depend on the correlation (e.g. 
similarities) between countries m and j.  
15 If the number of new products to the member countries increases, this implies that the chances to reach a market 
outside the PTA area with any of these new products also increase. The larger the number of exported products is, 
the larger is the number of opportunities or chances a country has to enter an additional market. 
16 According to Bayes theorem: P(A/B)=P(A∩B)/P(B). 
17 The first market that an exporter served can be either a market within or outside the bloc. Exports could also take 
place simultaneously and be directed to both type of markets. However in this case we can not disentangle the effect 
of the PTA on subsequent exports to a country outside the bloc.    81
4. The data  
In this section, we present the data used to sketch the geographical spreading of new products exported 
following the entry into force of eleven trade agreements. The same d a t a  i s  t h e n  e m p l o y e d  i n  t h e  
empirical analysis.  
The data for the trade agreements comes from the World Trade Organization Regional Trade Agreements 
Database and include both regional (i.e. seven in total which are among the most important in the world)
18 
and bilateral agreements.
19 The agreements involve a total of 36 countries and were selected mainly 
according to two criteria. First, a PTA was selected if it was the only agreement signed by a country 
within a period of six years. In other words, no trade agreement was signed in the three years preceding 
and following the selected PTA. By doing so, we are controlling for any overlapping effects of multiple 
agreements. Today most countries have more than one PTA. The lapse of time between each trade 
agreement is therefore particularly important to accurately identify the effects of an agreement. Once the 
trade agreement was identified, only those for which trade data were complete for the observation period 
were selected (this is the second criterion). The oldest trade agreement considered dates back to 1991 (i.e. 
MERCOSUR) and the most recent one to 2003 (i.e. Lebanon-EU). Appendix 1 shows the list of the 
retained trade agreements and their members.
 20 
As for the trade data, we only look at new exported products during the 5 years before and after the 
agreement. We build an 11-year window centred around the date of the agreement for each of the 36 
countries considered. We employ mirrored import data at the SITC
21  5-digit level collected from 
UNCTAD’s COMTRADE database. Mirror flows are used in order to have a greater accuracy of the 
zeros (i.e absence of trade) in the trade matrix. The data covers 36 exporters and 118 export destinations 
(see Appendix 2). We focus on new products in order to identify the patterns of market expansion. We 
define new products as those that were not exported to any country in any of the previous years 





                                                 
18 These are: the CAN (Andean Community), MERCOSUR, NAFTA, AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area), SADC 
(Southern African Development Community), WAEMU/ UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union) 
and EAC (East African Community). 
19 These are agreements signed by the EU and Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco and Lebanon.  
20 There are three exceptions to these criteria: Morocco, Turkey and Mexico. In these cases, criteria 1 is violated, but 
because of the potential importance of the effects of their agreements they were included in the sample. In the case 
of Morocco, it signed an FTA with EFTA in 1999 and the following year with the EU (i.e. violation of criteria 1). 
The trade effects resulting from the agreement with EFTA and the EU can not be disentangled. However, we focus 
on the effect of this structural break on the exports from Morocco to third countries. The second case is Turkey who 
signed an FTA with the EU in 1996 and the following year another one with Israel. Finally, Mexico signed NAFTA 
in 1994 and then the following year signed and agreement with Costa Rica.  
21 Total number of products under this classification is 1,466. The SITC classification offers in the case of this 
exercise the best trade-off between time coverage and product aggregation.     
22 We considered a 3-year lag is a reasonable assumption to identify new products at the beginning of the 
observation period.   82
Figure 2: Observation window 
           
According to this definition, products introduced in t-5 were not exported in any of the 3 previous years 
and those introduced in t+2 were not exported in any of the previous 10 years like shown in figure 2. 
5. New exports to members and third markets 
In this section, we look at the geographical expansion of goods. The purpose is to determine whether the 
entry into force of a PTA leads to a change in the number of new products exported to the preferential 
area and whether the same products are subsequently exported to other markets.  
Figure 3 reveals that for most countries the number of products exported to the PTA area tend to grow 
faster in the years that follow the agreement. This is line with the empirical evidence suggesting that a 
decline in tariffs leads to an expansion of the extensive margin (see inter alia Debaere and Mostshari, 
2005; Gomez and Volpe, 2008; Kehoe and Ruhl, 2009). The countries, for which the number of products 
did not grow faster or even decline during the years post-agreement, were most of the members of the 
Andean Community namely Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, as well as Paraguay, Uruguay, Thailand, 




We also compare how the number of new exported products evolved inside and outside the preferential 
area. Figure 4 shows that for the majority of countries in our sample the product expansion during the 
post-PTA years was greater within than outside the PTA area, except for a few countries (i.e. Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Mozambique and Cambodia). These figures suggest that for most countries the 
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Figure 4 
                                        
                                     
We now identify the new products, as previously defined, and then determine whether the same products 
were exported simultaneously or subsequently (i.e. within the next three years) to a market outside the 
preferential area. Figure 5 plots the number of new products exported to a PTA market during the first 3 
years (see Appendix 3) following the agreement and the share of products that were also exported to a 
third market. The number of new products exported to the preferential area varies greatly across countries. 
The share of products exported to markets outside the bloc also exhibits a large heterogeneity. This share 
ranges from 2% (Malawi) to 44% (Argentina). 
Figure 5 
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Finally, in order to assess whether there is a positive correlation between the number of products exported 
to third countries (given a previous entry in a member market) and the number of new products exported 
to a member market, we plot each of these numbers for t-2 (Figure 6a) and for the second year, t+1, of the 
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Figures 6a and 6b 
 
We find a positive correlation between the new exports to third countries and the new exports to member 
markets. This suggests that if a PTA increases the likelihood to export to member countries and raises the 
number of products within the preferential area, this can subsequently increase the likelihood to break into 
a third country. This proportionality is also visible at the aggregate level. Figure 7 shows for all countries 
the new products that break into the preferential area.  
Figure 7 
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For each product, we determine whether, the product was exported (i) only to a member market, (ii) to 
both member and non-member markets simultaneously, or (iii) to both markets, starting with a member 
market. At the aggregate level, we see that there is an increase in the number of all new products from one 
year before, t-1, to the year after the agreement, t+1. However in t+2, the total number of new products 
drops. Moreover, the pattern of the expansion of new products is relatively stable over time. Figure 7 
shows that around 65% of the new products exported to the preferential area were only exported to the 
PTA area, 25% where exported to the preferential area and then to outside the bloc (i.e. within the next 
three years).
23 Finally, 10% were exported simultaneously to both outside and inside the bloc, again 
                                                 
23Three years seems like a reasonable time frame to look for the spillover on the exports to third countries. Although 
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suggesting that if the total number of products changes, the number of products exported to other 
countries will also change. Although looking at the aggregates is necessarily an imperfect exercise, it 
allows us to get a sense of the trends among the countries in the sample.       
The data shows that through the exports of new products, a PTA could not only generate trade within the 
bloc but also outside the bloc. There is evidence that there is a positive correlation between the new 
exports within and outside the preferential area. A larger number of products within the bloc implies a 
larger number of opportunities to break into markets outside the PTA area.  
6. Empirical strategy and results 
In this section we test formally whether preferential trade agreements had any impact on the probability to 
export a new product to outside the bloc. Based on the sequence of exporting and on equation (3), we first 
test whether serving first a member country affects the probability to export to other destinations outside 
the preferential area. Then we estimate whether the PTAs can indirectly affect the exports to third 
countries by increasing export experimentation within the preferential area. 
Before proceeding with the empirical exercise and presenting our results, a main caveat related to our 
exercise need to be mentioned. One main concern in this type of exercise is the possibility of an omitted 
variable that explains new exports and is correlated with the implementation of the PTA. The best way to 
control for such problem would be to have a control group (i.e. counterfactual) composed of twin 
countries that did not implement any trade agreement but for which we could design a potential 
preferential area. Unfortunately, this ideal counterfactual does not exist. To mitigate this issue, we control 
for other time-specific events and use the tariffs applied within the PTA area as a proxy for the PTA, in 
addition to the usual PTA dummy. The advantage of using tariff data is that they provide an additional 
source of variation at the product level, which should improve the estimation of the probability of 
exporting a given product to third countries. However, the inclusion of the tariffs within the PTA area 
comes at a cost. The data on preferential tariffs is incomplete for many countries and years and this, 
therefore, greatly reduces the number of observations in our sample.     
6.1  Introduction of new products to non-member markets  
For the empirical exercise we start by identifying the new products introduced by each country into 
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 (5) 
A product k exported by country i is new if it belongs to the set I, that is, if it was exported in t, given that 
it was not exported at all before. We look only at this set of products in order to determine the order in 
which they are exported and where the export experience, if any, was acquired. Once the product has been 
                                                                                                                                                               
products that were exported to third countries after 4 years or more can not be detected. However, by increasing the 
time interval, we could be capturing other demand or supply effects.     86
exported for the first time, it can exhibit different expansion paths. It can be (i) exported only to the PTA 
area, (ii) only to outside the preferential area or (iii) to both. In this latter case, we need to identify the 
market that was served first (i.e. whether it was a market inside or outside the PTA area). With the 
purpose of assessing the effect of PTAs on the probability of introducing a new product in a country j 
outside the preferential area, we work only with the new products exported to countries
24 outside the PTA 
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Similarly we can defined the set of new products (M) that were introduced to country m inside the PTA 
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Using a fixed effects logit model (i.e. conditional logit model) we first estimate the effect of previous 
export experience in a member market on the probability to export for the first time a product to a market 
j outside the area. Then we test for the existence of a PTA spillover, by interacting the PTA dummy with 
a dummy that indicates whether the product was previously exported only to the preferential area. The 
equation to be estimated is the following:  
( ) ( ) ijkt t ijk ikt it it ikt ijkt Controls PTA Inside PTA PTA PTA Inside G NewP ε γ ω δ β β β + + + + + + = = _ * _ 1 Pr 3 2 1     
(8) 
 
where the dependent variable NewPijkt (as defined in (6)) equals 1 if country i exports product k in t to 
market j (outside the bloc) given that product k was not exported before to j and is new in the export 
portfolio of country i. Inside_PTAjkt is a dummy equal to 1 if product k was previously (i.e. in any of the 3 
previous years)
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If any previous export experience affects the probability to export to a market outside the area through 
any of three mechanisms discussed in section 3, we expect the coefficient β1 to be positive. The variable 
                                                 
24 A new product exported to a non-member market, can have a previous experience in another non-member market, 
in a member market or in none. 
25 We believe a three-year lag is a reasonable lapse of time within which an exporter can enter an additional market.   87
PTAit equals 1 if the exporter i was part of a preferential trade agreement in t, 0 otherwise. We then 
introduce the interaction term between the variable PTAit and Inside_PTAikt to determine the existence of a 
PTA spillover. If the coefficient of the interaction term is positive, this implies that the PTA generated an 
additional positive effect associated with the initial presence in member markets. In order to control for 
any previous experience in another market outside the PTA area, we introduce the variable 
Outside_PTAikt that equals 1 if country i exported product k only to non-member markets in any of the 3 
previous years. We include the variable InOut_PTAitk , that equals 1 if country i exported product k to 
both a member and a non-member market in any of the 3 previous years.
 26 By doing so, we want to take 
into account the possibility of a previous experience inside and outside the preferential area. We also add 
the GDP of the exporting and importing countries, the real exchange rate and a measure of similarity 
between country j and the first export market. By including the real exchange rate we expect to control for 
any change in the exporter competitiveness. A real depreciation (i.e. increase in the real exchange rate) 
should increase the probability of exporting a new product. We use the difference in the GDP per capita 
as a proxy for the similarity between country j and the market where product k was initially sold. We do 
so with the purpose of capturing the similarity in customers’ tastes and standards. We also control for the 
type of the trade agreement by adding a dummy that equals 1 if the agreement is a North-South agreement, 
and zero otherwise. In order to control for any change in the market access to other countries we include 
the applied tariffs for product k in country j. The data comes from WITS and is incomplete, which reduces 
the number of observations in our sample. Finally, t γ  and  ijk ω   are a time and an exporter-importer-
product fixed effects.  ijkt ε is an unobservable error term. Appendix 4 presents the list of all included 
variables and their sources.  
We estimate equation (8) using a conditional logit model. The unit of observation is at the exporter-
importer-product level. The advantage of this type of model is that it allows us to include fixed effects 
and thus to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood and 
integrates out the specific effects ( ijk ω ) by conditioning the sum of responses (i.e.∑ =1 ijkt NewP , 
∑ = 2 ijkt NewP ,.., ∑ − = 1 T NewP ijkt ) for a given individual over time. This also implies that 
observations that do not experience any change over time (i.e. products that were not exported at all 
during the period of observation or were exported in every year during the period of observation) do not 
contribute to the maximum likelihood estimation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, chapter 23).
27  
Table 1 reports the results. The first specification includes exporter and importer characteristics, as well 
as the three covariates accounting for past export experience. The second and third columns include the 
PTA dummy and the interaction term. In column 4, we account for the type of agreement as well as for 
market similarity between country j  and the first market the product was exported to. Finally, we 
introduce MFN tariffs applied by country j (situated outside the PTA area) for good k, to control for any 
change in market access conditions.       
                                                 
26Formally Outside_PTAikt and  InOut_PTAitk can be defined in a similar way than Inside_PTAikt. 
27 Marginal effects can not be computed, because they value depend on the  ijk ω  and the latter can not be estimated 
since they are integrated out. Only covariates signs can be interpreted as the sign of the effect of the covariates on the 
dependent variable. Another possibility is to interpret the coefficients in terms of the log-odds.   88
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
variables NewProd NewProd NewProd NewProd NewProd
exporter GDP (ln) 2.560*** 2.547*** 2.573*** 2.672*** 2.984***
(0.333) (0.335) (0.334) (0.335) (0.494)
importer GDP (ln) 0.128 0.136 0.130 0.120 -2.569***
(0.339) (0.339) (0.340) (0.336) (0.914)
exchange rate (ln) 0.546*** 0.543*** 0.542*** 0.532*** 0.619***
(0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.126) (0.189)
Experience inside PTA area 0.262*** 0.256*** -0.033 -0.024 0.130
(0.064) (0.061) (0.084) (0.084) (0.215)
Experience outside PTA area 0.452*** 0.442*** 0.455*** 0.450*** 0.399***
(0.058) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.143)
Experience in both 0.581*** 0.567*** 0.586*** 0.584*** 0.375***
(0.070) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.124)
exporter PTA 0.081 0.053 -0.003 0.065
(0.100) (0.097) (0.102) (0.106)
PTA*PTA experience 0.519*** 0.510*** 0.210
(0.107) (0.108) (0.217)
market similarity -0.049 -0.158
(0.047) (0.107)
N-S agreement 0.380* 0.326
(0.213) (0.353)
MFN applied tariffs -0.004
(0.004)
Observations 158,028 158,028 158,028 158,028 21,735
Table 1: Estimates on the probability to export a new product to a market outside the 
preferential area
Errors are clustered by exporter-importer. Time fixed effects are included but are not reported. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Inside_PTA, Outside_PTA and InOut_PTA are statistically significant and positive in all specifications, 
except for the Inside_PTA variable which becomes insignificant and negative once we introduce the 
interaction term (columns (4) and (5)). The results show that any previous export experience in product k, 
regardless of the market, has a positive effect on the probability of exporting the same product to another 
country. This is consistent with our assumption on the existence of a learning mechanism or economies of 
scale at the export level. The PTA variable is not significant in any of the specifications. This should not 
come as a surprise since the PTA should not have any direct effects on the exports to countries outside the 
preferential area. On the other hand the interaction term between the PTA variable and the Inside_PTA 
variable is positive and significant (column 3 and 4). This suggests the existence of an indirect positive 
effect -the spillover- of the PTA through the existence of a previous experience in a member market. 
Following the agreement more products could have been exported to the preferential area and thus 
benefited from a previous experience in the PTA area which could have improved the likelihood to be 
subsequently exported to a third country. Moreover, when this variable is included the Inside_PTA 
becomes insignificant. This confirms that the effect of previous export activity in the preferential area on 
the new exports to third countries was important only during the period post-PTA. As for the measure of   89
market similarity, it is negative but insignificant. The sign would imply that the larger the similarity 
between market j  and the initial market is in terms of their GDP per capita (i.e. the smaller their 
difference), the larger would be the probability to export to country j . The results also suggest that 
countries participating in a trade agreement with developed countries exhibit a larger probability to export 
to a third country. This could suggest that the agreement may have required the implementation of other 
institutional measures (i.e. trade facilitation, custom modernization, etc.), especially when the agreement 
was signed with a more developed country, and this could have benefited the export sector as a whole.
28 
In the last specification we include a measure of MFN tariffs applied by country j to control for the 
improved market access in other countries. The effect is negative, very small and not statistically 
significant. More importantly, our sample is greatly reduced and the result on the interaction term 
disappears. 
We now estimate the same model, but instead of using a dummy to proxy the effects of the PTA, we use 
the average preferential tariff applied within the preferential area. One could expect that products that 
exhibit low tariffs have a higher probability to be exported to a member market and then through any of 
the expansion mechanisms to a market outside the area. With the implementation of the agreement, the 
effect of the tariffs within the preferential area on the probability to export to a third country should be 
larger. The equation to be estimated is the following: 
( ) ( ) ijkt t ijk ikt it it ikt ijkt Controls PTA Inside PTA tar PTA tar PTA Inside G NewP ε γ ω δ β β β + + + + + + = = _ * _ _ _ 1 Pr 3 2 1
(9) 
where tar_PTA is the average tariff of product k applied within the preferential area in time t.  
                                                 
28 Another possible explanation could be, that independently of the market expansion mechanisms, if an exporter 
managed to export to a developed country (i.e. self-selection), usually considered as more difficult, it would be 
probably easier for him to subsequently export to other less difficult destination.       90
(1) (2) (3)
variables NewProd NewProd NewProd
exporter GDP (ln) 2.274*** 2.287*** 1.972*
(0.599) (0.603) (1.110)
importer GDP (ln) -0.124 -0.120 -2.028*
(0.502) (0.502) (1.065)
exchange rate (ln) 0.325 0.332 -0.039
(0.211) (0.212) (0.320)
Experience inside PTA area 0.499*** 0.605*** 0.054
(0.158) (0.161) (0.530)
Experience outside PTA area 0.636*** 0.637*** 0.442
(0.117) (0.117) (0.280)
Experience in both 0.711*** 0.713*** 0.243
(0.126) (0.126) (0.307)
tariffs within PTA area 0.003 0.004 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009)






MFN applied tariffs 0.000
(0.007)
Observations 23,127 23,127 3,083
Table 2: Estimates on the probability to export a new product to a 
market outside the preferential area using tariff data
Errors are clustered by exporter-importer. Time fixed effects are included but not reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
 
The results concerning the effect of previous export experience are similar to the previous estimation. The 
tariffs applied within the preferential area not significant and thus have no direct effect on the probability 
to export to a third country. As for the interaction term, its effect is negative, therefore suggesting that 
lower tariffs had an additional positive impact on the probability to export to non-member countries 
following the implementation of the PTA.  However, its effect is only statistically significant when we 
control for market access in countries outside the preferential area. This last specification counts with a 
reduced number of observations, and the results should be therefore taken with precaution. 
6.2  Introduction of new products to non-member markets by agreement  
In order to distinguish among the different agreements included in our sample, we estimate equation 8 but 
this time we include a dummy for each of the agreements considered as well as the respective spillover 
covariate (i.e. interaction term). For instance the dummy CAN equals 1, if the exporting country was a 
member of the CAN, and zero otherwise. The spillover is built as before, that is, it is the interaction 
between the dummy related to the agreement and the existence of any previous experience in the PTA   91
area. The results are shown in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 are the same columns presented in table 1, and 
are included as reference. In column 3, we control for the agreements.  
We find that NAFTA and the ASEAN agreement had a direct positive and significant effect on the 
probability of exporting to third countries. Although surprising, this could simply imply that these 
agreements had a broader positive effect on exporters. It is possible that the implementation of the PTA 
improved the business environment and exporting conditions in general, thus having an impact on all 
exports and not only on those directed to member countries. On the other hand EAC and SADC had 
negative and significant direct effect on the probability to export to countries outside the preferential area. 
This could suggest that these two agreements pushed for a re-orientation of the new exports to member 
countries. As for the rest of PTAs, their coefficients are not statistically significant.  
Results regarding the interaction term between the PTA dummy and a previous experience in the PTA 
area suggest that there was a spillover on the exports to third countries in the case of MERCOSUR, 
ASEAN, SADC, UEMOA, EAC and the EU.
29 Finally, like in previous results the effect of a previous 
experience in the PTA area becomes negative and insignificant when we control for the existence of a 
trade agreement and a spillover effect.    
Ai and Norton (2003) highlight that the signs of the interaction terms in non-linear models can be 
misleading. To check for this possibility we perform the three regressions using a linear probability model. 
The sign of the interaction terms are consistent with the results in the logit model in all regressions, 
except in the case of ASEAN in the third regression. Results are not shown for brevity.  
                                                 
29 In the case of EAC and SADC the results suggest that the implementation of the PTA had a negative effect on the 
probability to export directly to non-members. Yet, they also exhibit a positive spillover. This is not necessarily 
contradictory, as the spillovers result from the experience that exporters were able to acquire in markets within the 
bloc and which subsequently triggered the exports to markets outside the PTA area.   92
(1) (2) (3)
variables NewProd NewProd NewProd
exporter GDP (ln) 2.560*** 2.573*** 2.222***
(0.333) (0.334) (0.299)
importer GDP (ln) 0.128 0.130 0.246
(0.339) (0.340) (0.321)
exchange rate (ln) 0.546*** 0.542*** 0.494***
(0.129) (0.127) (0.134)
Experience inside PTA area 0.262*** -0.033 -0.019
(0.064) (0.084) (0.084)
Experience outside PTA area 0.452*** 0.455*** 0.470***
(0.058) (0.054) (0.053)




































EU*EU experience  0.598**
(0.245)
Observations 158,028 158,028 158,028
Table 3: Estimates on the probability to export a new product to a market outside the 
preferential area
Errors are clustered by exporter-importer. Time fixed effects are included but are not reported. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    93
7. Conclusions  
Given the increasing role of preferential trade agreements in countries’ trade agendas, it is important to 
determine whether PTAs can promote new exports both within and beyond the bloc. Using trade data for 
36 countries at the SITC 5-digit level and for eleven PTAs over an 11-year window, this paper examines 
whether a PTA can generate a positive indirect effect – or spillover – on the exports to third countries. We 
identify three mechanisms. The first one is based on the presence of economies of scale at the production 
level, the second one on learning by exporting, and the last one on scale economies at the export level. All 
three could explain the spillovers we identify empirically.  
To test whether such spillover effect exists, we first estimate the effect of any previous experience within 
the PTA area on the probability of exporting the same product to a market outside the preferential area. 
We find that a previous experience in a member market does increase the probability of exporting to a 
third country. We then test for the existence of a PTA spillover, that is, whether the latter effect changes 
once the PTA enters into force. To this end, we interact a dummy variable that indicates whether or not 
there is a trade agreement with a dummy that signals whether the product was exported before to a 
member country.  
Our results suggest that an initial experience in the PTA area has a positive effect on the probability to 
export to a third country during the years that follow the agreement. This implies that by expanding the 
extensive margin within the preferential area, PTAs could catalyze market expansion outside the bloc and 
be stepping stones to enter into other markets. We also test our model using the average tariffs within the 
preferential area, instead of the PTA dummy. The results supporting the existence of a PTA spillover are 
not conclusive. Finally, we individually test for the existence of a spillover effect for all the agreements 
included in our sample and find evidence in the case of MERCOSUR, ASEAN, SADC, UEMOA, EAC 
and the EU.  
Although the precise channels of influence require further study, it seems that by promoting the exports of 
new products within the preferential area, PTAs catalyze these mechanisms and thus encourage firms to 
break into extra-PTA markets. Once an exporter has entered the preferential market, it can benefit from 
economies of scale at the production level, at the export level, and/or from learning effects – all of which 
can reduce the costs of breaking into markets outside the preferential area. This implies that a larger 
number of products exported to the bloc increase the likelihood that the country will enter an additional 
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Appendix 1 
Trade agreement year of entry 
into force
Exporter Country group
AFTA 1992 Brunei Darussalam High income
AFTA 1999 Cambodia Low income
AFTA 1992 Indonesia Lower middle income
AFTA 1997 Lao PDR Low income
AFTA 1992 Malaysia Upper middle income
AFTA 1992 Philippines Lower middle income
AFTA 1992 Thailand Lower middle income
AFTA 1995 Vietnam Low income
CAN 1993 Bolivia Lower middle income
CAN 1993 Colombia Lower middle income
CAN 1993 Ecuador Lower middle income
CAN 1993 Peru Lower middle income
CAN 1993 Venezuela Upper middle income
EAC* 2000 Kenya Low income
EAC 2000 Uganda Low income
EC - Lebanon 2003 Lebanon Upper middle income
EC - Morocco 2000 Morocco Lower middle income
EC - Tunisia 1998 Tunisia Lower middle income
EC - Turkey 1996 Turkey Upper middle income
MERCOSUR 1991 Argentina Upper middle income
MERCOSUR 1991 Brazil Upper middle income
MERCOSUR 1991 Paraguay Lower middle income
MERCOSUR 1991 Uruguay Upper middle income
NAFTA 1994 Mexico Upper middle income
SADC** 2000 Angola Lower middle income
SADC 2000 Malawi Low income
SADC 2000 Mozambique Low income
SADC 2000 Zambia Low income
SADC 2000 Zimbabwe Low income
WAEMU/UEMOA 2000 Benin Low income
WAEMU/UEMOA 2000 Burkina Faso Low income
WAEMU/UEMOA 2000 Côte d'Ivoire Low income
WAEMU/UEMOA 2000 Mali Low income
WAEMU/UEMOA 2000 Niger Low income
WAEMU/UEMOA 2000 Senegal Low income
WAEMU/UEMOA 2000 Togo Low income
* Tanzania was excluded.
**Tanzania and South Africa were excluded.  





United Arab Emirates Guyana Panama





Burkina Faso India Qatar
Bangladesh Ireland Romania
Bahrain Iran, Islamic Rep. Russian Federation
Bahamas Israel Rwanda
Belarus Italy Saudi Arabia
Belgium Jamaica Senegal
Belize Jordan Singapore
Bolivia Japan El Salvador
Brazil Kazakhstan Suriname
Botswana Kenya Slovenia
Central African Republic Cambodia Sweden
Canada Korea, Rep. Syrian Arab Republic
Switzerland Kuwait Togo
Chile Lebanon Thailand
China Sri Lanka Trinidad and Tobago
Cote d'Ivoire Macao, China Tunisia
Cameroon Morocco Turkey
Colombia Madagascar Taiwan, Province of China
Cape Verde Mexico Tanzania
Costa Rica Macedonia, FYR Uganda
Czech Republic Mali Ukraine
Germany Mongolia Uruguay
Denmark Mozambique United States
Algeria Mauritania Venezuela
Ecuador Mauritius Vietnam







Guinea New Zealand    99
Appendix 3 
 Number of new products following the trade agreement
Treaty member exporter t  t+1  t+2 t+3 TOTAL 
AFTA Brunei Darussalam 31 31 27 39 128
A F T A I n d o n e s i a 1 41 31 31 45 4
AFTA Cambodia 23 34 45 42 144
AFTA Lao PDR 15 8 11 13 47
A F T A M a l a y s i a 8673 2 4
AFTA Philippines 8 11 18 13 50
AFTA Thailand 11 10 3 0 24
A F T A V i e t n a m 4 53 73 94 0 1 6 1
CAN Bolivia 27 38 17 22 104
C A N C o l o m b i a 2 62 12 02 28 9
CAN Ecuador 42 24 30 17 113
C A N P e r u 3 63 61 92 4 1 1 5
CAN Venezuela 25 15 11 9 60
EAC Kenya 37 14 15 5 71
E A C U g a n d a 1 61 42 32 78 0
EC - Lebanon Lebanon 6 10 7 13 36
EC - Morocco Morocco 17 17 25 15 74
EC - Tunisia Tunisia 20 30 16 16 82
EC - Turkey Turkey 5 11 11 4 31
MERCOSUR Argentina 4 10 3 2 19
M E R C O S U R B r a z i l 21407
MERCOSUR Paraguay 34 58 50 45 187
MERCOSUR Uruguay 48 68 42 44 202
N A F T A M e x i c o 4554 1 8
SADC Angola 25 48 41 27 141
SADC Mozambique 103 46 24 35 208
SADC Malawi 62 45 49 33 189
SADC Zambia 66 66 47 23 202
SADC Zimbabwe 56 40 25 11 132
WAEMU/UEMOA Benin 46 59 36 65 206
WAEMU/UEMOA Burkina Faso 23 48 48 53 172
WAEMU/UEMOA Côte d'Ivoire 22 31 20 23 96
WAEMU/UEMOA Mali 15 30 12 68 125
W A E M U / U E M O AN i g e r 61 11 05 78 4
WAEMU/UEMOA Senegal 11 88 53 24 176
WAEMU/UEMOA Togo 30 62 46 176 314
Note: t year refers to the year when the PTA enters into force. 
Number of new products exported to the PTA area 
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Appendix 4 
variables description source 
GDP, GDP per capita in US PPP for the 1988-2006 period. World Development 
Indicators
real exchange rate
 The real exchange rate is the value of national 




Experience inside PTA area 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the product was 
previouly (i.e. in any of the last 3 years) 
exported only to a PTA market, 0 otherwise. 
authors's calculation 
Experience oustide PTA area 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the product was 
previously (i.e. in any of the last 3 years) 




dummy variable that equals 1 if the product was 
previously exported (i.e. in any of the last 3 




dummy variable, equal 1 if the exporter has a 
PTA in t, 0 otherwise. 
RTA database, World Trade 
Organization 
Tariffs outside the PTA area
MFN tariffs in period t applied by non-
members for product k  (simple average).  WITS
Tariffs within the PTA area Average applied/preferential tariffs in period t 
for product k within the PTA area.  WITS
Market similarity
difference in the GDP per capita between the 
country (largest cities in the country) that was 
served first and the country (largest cities in the 
country) that was subsequently served. 
World Development 
Indicators and author's 
calculation
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 